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A Case Study in Underachievement:
The International Courts and Genocide
in Bosnia-Herzegovina
Marko Attila Hoare
Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences, Kingston University
Two international courts—the UN’s International Criminal Tribunal for the
former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the International Court of Justice (ICJ)—have
established that genocide occurred in Srebrenica in Bosnia in 1995. Germany’s
courts have concluded that genocide occurred in both Northern and Eastern
Bosnia in 1992, and an appeal against a conviction for genocide on this basis
was dismissed by a third international court—the European Court of Human
Rights (ECHR). Yet, there has been minimal international punishment of genocide
in Bosnia. Serbia was convicted by the ICJ only of a failure to prevent and punish
genocide. Only one middle-ranking individual has been convicted of a genociderelated charge by the ICTY; three others of similar or lower rank have been
convicted but are appealing the convictions. Only six individuals from Serbia or
Montenegro were ever indicted by the ICTY for war crimes in Bosnia and no
one has yet been convicted. Of the two most notorious Bosnian Serb genocide
suspects—Ratko Mladić and Radovan Karadžić—the first has not yet been
arrested while the second was arrested only in July 2008 and has not yet been
convicted. International awareness that systematic mass murder occurred in
Bosnia and the courts’ conclusive verdict that at least some of this involved
genocide have translated into minimal punishment of the perpetrators. This paper
explores the reasons why international justice has underachieved in regards to
the mass murder in Bosnia by examining the structural weaknesses, political
pressures, and errors of judgment that have hampered the international courts.
Key words: Bosnia, Serbia, genocide, international justice, war crimes

The systematic mass murder that occurred in Bosnia in the first half of the 1990s
has perhaps entered into the international consciousness more than any other case
of systematic mass murder since the Holocaust. The Bosnian War has been described
as the most publicized war in history. Partly as a result of this, the mass murder in
Bosnia has received an unprecedented level of attention in the international courts.
In 1993, the UN Security Council established the International Criminal Tribunal
for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) to prosecute individual war criminals. The ICTY
has indicted over 150 political and military figures from the former Yugoslavia. So
far, the ICTY has successfully prosecuted one individual for genocide—the Bosnian
Serb officer Radislav Krstić. He was convicted on 2 August 2001, but on 19 April
2004 his conviction was reduced on appeal to the lesser charge of aiding and abetting
genocide. A second Bosnian Serb officer, Vidoje Blagojević, was convicted of genocide
on 17 January 2005 but subsequently acquitted on appeal on 9 May 2007 of all
genocide-related charges. Finally, on 10 June 2010, two more officers, Vujadin
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Popović and Ljubiša Beara, were convicted of genocide while a third, Drago Nikolić,
was convicted of aiding and abetting genocide; all three appealed their convictions on
8 September 2010, and the final outcome remains uncertain at the time of writing.
In the same year that the ICTY was established, Bosnia filed charges with the
International Court of Justice (ICJ), accusing Serbia of genocide. The ICJ delivered
its verdict in 2007, acquitting Serbia of genocide, but nevertheless finding Serbia
guilty of failing to prevent the genocide at Srebrenica and of failing to punish genocide
by sheltering war criminals indicted by the ICTY. Also, in 1997, a German court,
the Higher Regional Court of Düsseldorf, convicted Nikola Jorgić, a Bosnian Serb,
for committing genocide in the Northern Bosnian region of Doboj in 1992. Jorgić
challenged his conviction, and brought his case all the way to the European Court
of Human Rights (ECHR), to which he appealed on the grounds that the definition
of genocide used to convict him in Germany was not in accordance with the international legal definition of the crime. The ECHR rejected his appeal and confirmed
the legality of Jorgić’s conviction, noting that ‘‘the German courts’ interpretation
has not only been supported by a number of scholars at the relevant time of
the commission of the crime’’ but that ‘‘the UN General Assembly agreed with the
wider interpretation adopted by the German courts in the present case,’’ and that
‘‘[c]onsequently, the applicant’s acts, which he committed in the course of the ethnic
cleansing in the Doboj region with intent to destroy the group of Muslims as a social
unit, could reasonably be regarded as falling within the ambit of the offence of
genocide.’’ 1
Thus, three different international courts—the ICTY, the ICJ, and the ECHR—
have reached verdicts that support the view that genocide occurred in Bosnia. There
is, however, some disagreement between the courts. The ICJ resolved that genocide
in Bosnia occurred only in the Srebrenica massacre of 1995. The judges specifically
stated that genocide did not occur at other times or places in Bosnia.2 The ECHR,
by contrast, upheld the decision of the German courts that crimes consistent with
the international legal definition of genocide did indeed occur outside of Srebrenica—
in Northern Bosnia in 1992. Another German court, the Bavarian Appeals Chamber,
concluded in the hearing on 23 May 1997 of the appeal of another Serb suspect,
Novislav Džajić, that genocide occurred also in the Foča region of East Bosnia in
1992. The ICTY prosecutors tried unsuccessfully to prosecute Bosnian Serb perpetrators for genocide in areas other than Srebrenica. Momčilo Krajišnik, a member of the
presidency of Bosnia’s Serb Republic—Republika Srpska—was the highest-ranking
Bosnian Serb official to be acquitted of genocide. But unlike in the case of the ICJ,
the judges at the ICTY did not say genocide had not occurred, but rather that it
had not been proven beyond all reasonable doubt.3 Ongoing proceedings at the
ICTY, in particular against Radovan Karadžić, may yet uphold the prosecution’s
contention that genocide occurred in Bosnia outside of Srebrenica, though this
remains to be seen. Nevertheless, despite these differences, three different international courts agree that genocide occurred in Bosnia or that crimes occurred in
Bosnia that can legitimately be defined as genocide.
The paradox is that there has been minimal punishment of this genocide, which
has essentially been limited to the punishment of a handful of low- and middleranking individual Serb perpetrators; the highest-ranking suspects thus far convicted
of genocide-related charges have been Radislav Krstić, a major-general and deputy
commander of the Drina Corps of the Army of the Serb Republic (i.e., the Bosnian
Serb army) and Ljubiša Beara, a colonel and Chief of Security of the General Staff
of the Army of the Serb Republic. Serbia was convicted of nothing worse than a
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failure to prevent and punish genocide. Bosnia’s claim for damages against Serbia
was dismissed by the ICJ. Only one individual—a lowly deputy corps commander—
has been convicted of a genocide-related charge by an international court (while
Jorgić was a still more lowly figure, a local paramilitary leader, convicted by a
national court). Two other low-ranking Serbs, Maksim Sokolović and Ðurad Kušlić,
were also convicted of genocide-related offences by German courts. The conviction of
Popović and Beara for genocide and of Nikolić for aiding and abetting genocide by
the ICTY remains to be upheld or overturned by the appeals chamber.
The War Crimes Chamber of Bosnia-Herzegovina, a hybrid tribunal in which the
national judges play the leading role and international judges a supporting role,4 has
a jurisdiction that is limited to ‘‘lower- and intermediate-rank accused,’’ but has been
readier to hand down genocide convictions; it found seven low-ranking Serbs guilty of
genocide on 29 July 2008, one of whom was subsequently acquitted on appeal. Three
other low-ranking Serbs were subsequently convicted of genocide by this court, and a
fourth has pleaded guilty to genocide before it. All these cases related to genocide
in Srebrenica. Prosecutors at the War Crimes Chamber have not been willing to
prosecute suspects for genocide outside of Srebrenica.
Only six people from Serbia or Montenegro were ever even indicted by the ICTY
for any kind of war crime in Bosnia. Most of the principal organizers of war crimes
in Croatia and Bosnia were never indicted. Of the six indicted, one was killed before
being arrested, one died during trial, and procedures against the other four are
ongoing. So at the present time, not one single official, soldier, or politician from
Serbia has yet been convicted by the ICTY for war crimes in Bosnia, let alone for
genocide. Yet it was the regime of Slobodan Milošević in Serbia and the Yugoslav
army controlled by Serbia that established the Bosnian Serb army and organized
the mass killing in Bosnia—a fact not disputed by the ICJ in its acquittal of Serbia
for genocide. Finally, up to the present day, of the two most notorious war-crimes
indictees apart from Milošević, namely the Bosnian Serb leaders Ratko Mladić and
Radovan Karadžić, the first has still not been arrested while the second was arrested
only in July 2008 and has not yet been convicted at the time of writing. So the
overwhelming international awareness that systematic mass murder took place in
Bosnia and the conclusive verdict of the courts that at least some of this involved
genocide have translated into very little in the way of convicting or punishing the
perpetrators for the crime of genocide and into relatively little in the way of convicting or punishing the most senior perpetrators even for lesser offences. This paper
aims to explore why it is that international justice has failed in the case of Bosnia.

Rejecting Conspiracy Theories
We can begin by rejecting the easy explanation that international justice failed
because the ‘‘great powers’’ wanted it to fail and the international courts are simply
the tools of great-power policy. A lot of the discourse about the war in the former
Yugoslavia has revolved around theories of Western imperialist conspiracies, and
interested parties have posited a number of these conspiracies, most of them supposedly directed against the Serbs. There was, according to various accounts, an
imperialist conspiracy to break up Yugoslavia; an imperialist conspiracy to demonize
the Serbs by exaggerating their atrocities; an imperialist conspiracy to provoke the
war between NATO and Serbia over Kosovo; and so on and so forth.5 One of
the most imaginative of these supposed conspiracies was the Jewish American conspiracy to appease the Muslim world at the expense of the Serbs to compensate for
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American support for Israel.6 On the other side, to a lesser extent, there has been
talk of imperialist conspiracies directed against the Muslims.7
All conspiracy theories should be rejected in principle because they are not
rooted in serious evidence or analysis. This does not mean that serious criticisms
should not be made of Western policy. But the most powerful critiques of this kind
are made on the basis of empirical evidence. A prime example is Brendan Simms’s
damning study of British policy toward Bosnia in the first half of the 1990s.8 One of
the fiercest critiques of the failure of international justice has been made by Florence
Hartmann, the former spokeswoman for Carla del Ponte, chief prosecutor at the
ICTY. Hartmann’s book Peace and Punishment catalogues many of the failures of
the ICTY.9 But although there are many things that are positive about Hartmann’s
book, its principal weakness is that it attempts to portray many of the staff at
the ICTY, in particular British and Americans, as motivated by the policies of
the Western, in particular British and American, governments which, according to
Hartmann, are above all concerned with trying to cover up Western complicity in
the Srebrenica massacre and Serbian crimes in general. Having myself worked at
the Office of the Prosecutor of the ICTY, I find the idea that most or many staff
members were motivated by their governments’ policies simply implausible. This
applies equally to accusations that the ICTY was ‘‘NATO’s court,’’ or a political
instrument of the great powers.10
The ICTY was an institution in its own right, and its actions were determined by
its relationship with other institutions and by its own internal structure. There were
different bodies and individuals within the ICTY, and there were different currents
of opinion. To imply that some of these currents simply reflected the policies of their
governments, while others did not, is not credible. This paper will adopt a different
approach, and examine the institutional, procedural and conceptual weaknesses and
mistakes which have characterised the work of the international courts with regard
to Bosnia. We shall begin with the ICTY, because the decisions of the ICTY themselves impacted upon those of the ICJ.

The ICTY’s Structural Weaknesses vis-à-vis the Outside World
The ICTY was structurally flawed in two respects: in its relationship to the outside
world and in its internal organization. It was established in 1993 on a shoestring
budget, without even the goodwill of most members of the UN Security Council other
than the United States. For example, Britain for years failed to donate any money to
the ICTY’s budget. The ICTY began as an apparently insignificant institution that
appeared destined to go after only the small fish. The first person prosecuted was
Dušan Tadić, a concentration camp guard who happened to be recognized by one of
his former victims in Germany where he was arrested. Although the two most senior
Bosnian Serb figures, the political leader Radovan Karadžić and the military leader
Ratko Mladić, were both indicted in 1995, the international forces made little or no
effort to arrest them in the years immediately following the signing of the peace
agreement.
Hartmann argues that the failure to arrest Karadžić and Mladić was deliberate, as these two could have incriminated Western politicians over the events at
Srebrenica.11 Former ICTY Deputy Chief Prosecutor Graham Blewitt confirmed
in an interview following his departure from the Tribunal in 2004 that there was
indeed a lack of Western will to arrest the two.12 The lack of will was probably
related, among other things, to an American fear of possible casualties that might
have occurred during an attempt at arrest. Following his arrest in July 2008 and
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delivery to the ICTY, Karadžić attempted to claim immunity from prosecution on the
grounds that Richard Holbrooke, the United States’s Balkan envoy who brokered
the Dayton Peace Accords in 1995, had promised him such immunity on condition
that he retire from public life. The ICTY rejected Karadžić’s claim to immunity and
Holbrooke denied that any such deal had been made.13 Nevertheless, US history professor Charles Ingrao has confirmed, on the basis of US State Department sources,
that Holbrooke did indeed promise Karadžić immunity from arrest, though not from
prosecution, in return for withdrawal from politics.14 The ICTY, from the start,
therefore suffered from the fact that it had to rely on an unenthusiastic international
community to deliver the indictees to it. Furthermore, the ICTY prosecutors had no
means of collecting evidence except with the consent of the former Yugoslav states.
Both Serbia and, initially, Croatia were essentially hostile to the ICTY, and when
they were not forthcoming with the documentary evidence, the ICTY prosecutors
had to rely upon the international community to apply the necessary pressure. This,
too, was not always forthcoming or sufficient.
In the period after the fall of Milošević in 2000, Chief Prosecutor Carla del Ponte
made several trips to Belgrade to seek the cooperation of the new Serbian regime.
But this led her into negotiations with Serbian leaders, which arguably resulted in
the increasing politicization of the ICTY. Indeed, del Ponte’s recently published
memoirs reveal that international diplomacy—in the form of negotiations with
former-Yugoslav, Western and international officials, in which she was forced to
engage in a complex game of threatening and cajoling, demanding and conceding—
wholly dominated her work as chief prosecutor, at least as she presents it.15 This
representation of events has been upheld by Victor Peskin’s study of the international diplomacy of the ICTY and its sister tribunal, the International Criminal
Tribunal for Rwanda.16 In order to prove to her Serbian interlocutors that the ICTY
was not anti-Serb, del Ponte came under pressure to indict more non-Serbs. We do not
know if her policy on indictments was influenced by this pressure. But we do know
that of the 125 individuals indicted by the ICTY for war crimes in Bosnia, 89 of them
or 71% were Serb soldiers, politicians, or officials (including at least two non-Serbs
who held positions in Serb or Serb-controlled bodies), while 36 or 29% were Croats
and Muslims.17 Given that at least 86% of the killing of civilians during the Bosnian
war was the work of Serb forces, this amounts to a substantial overrepresentation of
non-Serbs among the indictees—non-Serbs carried out one seventh of the killing
of civilians but made up two sevenths of indictees.18 Serbia and the Bosnian Serb
Republic—Republika Srpska—were the least cooperative with the former Yugoslav
entities with regard to the ICTY and this resistance may have paid dividends, with
the ICTY prosecutors backing off.

Deficiencies in the ICTY’s Internal Organization
The National Quota
The ICTY has been caught between Serbian and Bosnian Serb obstructionism on the
one hand and inadequate support from the international community on the other.
But its failures also stem from its own internal organization. The internal organization of the ICTY’s Office of the Prosecutor is not open to the public, but as I worked
there myself, I can provide some inside information. Hartmann and del Ponte have
also provided some insights in their books, as have Blewitt and Geoffrey Nice (former
chief prosecutor in the Milošević trial) in interviews. I was working at the Office of
the Prosecutor in 2001, when the ICTY seemed to be at the height of its success. It
was in this period that Milošević arrived at the Hague. At that time, the Office of the
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Prosecutor had eleven investigative teams. Of these, seven teams were devoted to
Serb war crimes and four to non-Serb war crimes.
As noted above, at least 86% of the killing of civilians in the Bosnian war was
the work of Serb or Serb-controlled forces. There are no comparably precise figures
for civilians killed by Serb vis-à-vis non-Serb forces in the Croatian and Kosovo
wars. Total Croatian war losses between 1991 and 1995 have been most scientifically
estimated at 22,192; non-Serbs made up 15,970, or 72% of the total; of these, 45%
were civilians, while of the 6,222 Serbs killed or missing, the proportion of civilians
is unknown.19 Total Kosovo Albanian war losses have been estimated at 10,356 for
the period between March and June 1999 according to one scientific study and at
12,000 for the period between February 1998 and June 1999 according to another.20
There are no accurate figures to confirm how many of these were civilians—
something especially difficult to calculate, given that ‘‘Albanian military casualties’’
in Kosovo would refer to losses sustained by an irregular, guerrilla army. Nor are
there any accurate figures for Serb losses at the hands of the Kosovo Liberation
Army. But by any reckoning, Serb forces were responsible for well over 80% of
civilian casualties in all of the former Yugoslav wars combined.
However, at the time that I was working at the ICTY, seven out of the eleven
investigative teams (64%) at the Office of the Prosecutor were devoted to investigating Serb crimes and four (36%) to investigating Croat, Muslim, and Albanian crimes.
This means that Serb indictees were underrepresented in relation to their share of
the war crimes—less than two thirds of the investigative teams were devoted to the
side in the war that was responsible for over four fifths of total civilian fatalities.
Such an organizational structure appears to have been set up in order to guarantee
a particular distribution of indictees between the nationalities, as each investigative
team would work to achieve a certain number of ‘‘kills.’’ Indeed, the distribution of
indictments between Serbs and non-Serbs broadly corresponds to the distribution
of the investigative teams: of 159 total indictments, 108 or 68% were of Serbs (i.e.,
of soldiers, officials, and politicians of Serb or Serb-controlled bodies) and 51 or 32%
were of non-Serbs (i.e., of soldiers, officials, and politicians of Croatia, the Bosnian
government, Albanian or Macedonian bodies). The motive may have been to refute
accusations of ‘‘anti-Serb bias’’ and to convince the international public that the
prosecution was even handed.
There were some peculiarities that arose as a result. The top Yugoslav army
commanders, who commanded the Yugoslav and Serb forces against Croatia in
1991–1992, were not indicted. Only middle-ranking officers were indicted for the
single worst war crime of the Croatian war, at the Vukovar Hospital, while two other
relatively junior officers and two somewhat more senior but not top-ranking ones
were indicted over the JNA (Yugoslav People’s Army) attack on Dubrovnik. By contrast, the most senior Croatian commander in the period between 1992 and 1995,
Chief of Staff Janko Bobetko, was indicted for a crime occurring when Croatia
attempted to recapture some territory in 1993 at the Medak Pocket. The top commander of the Croatian Interior Ministry forces, Mladen Markač, was indicted for
crimes carried out during Operation Storm in 1995. Overall, more senior Croatian
commanders were indicted over Operation Storm than was the case for Yugoslav
commanders indicted over the war against Croatia.
Similarly, the top Yugoslav army commanders who commanded Yugoslav and
Serb forces during the assault on Bosnia in 1992 were not indicted. Only Momčilo
Perisić, the Yugoslav Army commander from 1993 onward, after the direct Serbian
aggression had already ended, was indicted. By contrast, the two most senior
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Bosnian Army commanders during the war, Sefer Halilović and Rasim Delić, were
both indicted. So in terms of top commanders, Serbia was treated more leniently
than either Croatia or Bosnia, in regards to the war crimes committed in those
countries. This had nothing to do with lack of evidence. On the basis of the principle
of command responsibility, the prosecutors only had to prove that the top Yugoslav
commanders had formal command over the lower-ranking officers they had already
indicted—such as the Vukovar Three, for example—and they would have had a
case. The prosecutors simply chose not to make these indictments.

Overemphasis on Bosnians
There was, furthermore, an additional distortion, which was that the indictments
of both Serbs and Croats disproportionately targeted Bosnian Serbs and Bosnian
Croats. Thus, over three quarters of all Serb indictees were Bosnian Serbs, and over
three quarters of all Croat indictees were Bosnian Croats. This can be explained in a
number of ways. One possibility is that the policy of targeting Bosnians was related
to low expectations; that is, the prosecutors avoided targeting Serbs from Serbia
because they did not believe they would ever be arrested and so they felt that it
would be a waste of time. Hartmann claims that until Milošević actually arrived
at the Hague, even senior prosecutors did not believe that he ever would.21 This
appears possible to me. When I was working at the Tribunal, I remember that staff
would discuss among themselves whether Milošević or Karadžić would arrive first;
we just did not know. Indeed, when Bosnian Serb Presidency member Biljana
Plavšić, one of the most senior figures to be tried, arrived promptly at the Tribunal
after being indicted in January 2001, her arrival was something of a surprise and
the case against her had not been properly prepared. She was allowed to make a
plea bargain for a sentence of only eleven years, she was not required to testify
against others, and the genocide charge against her was dropped.
The ICTY began life as a Tribunal that targeted the little fish, and even as it
gained strength and confidence, it was not able to change its structural character
and behave like a Tribunal that targeted the big fish. Thus, the ICTY has prosecuted
numerous camp guards and middle-ranking officers, but has avoided indicting most
of the principal organizers of the war in Bosnia. A second explanation is that the
members of the Office of the Prosecutor who decided whom to indict did not include
any actual experts on the war in the former Yugoslavia. There were academic
specialists on the war, such as myself, who were working at the Tribunal, but we
were researchers, not decision makers. This is a point that Hartmann stressed to
me when we discussed this subject; the lawyers and police personnel who took the
key decisions on indictments simply may not have understood the mechanisms of
the conflict all that well.22 They may really have believed that the conflict was a civil
war for which Serbia was not directly responsible.

Failure to Pursue the ‘‘Joint Criminal Enterprise’’
We shall return later to the question of whether what happened in Bosnia outside of
Srebrenica was genocide or whether it was simply systematic mass murder. Leaving
that question temporarily aside, the evidence is nevertheless conclusive that what
happened in Bosnia was a centrally planned and directed programme of mass killings
that originated with the Milošević regime in Belgrade. All Bosnian Serb forces were
both de jure and de facto under the command of the JNA right up until 19 May
1992. The JNA was under the control of the republics of Serbia and Montenegro.
Mladić, the Bosnian Serb commander, was appointed to his position by the Yugoslav
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military command.23 The largest phase of mass killings occurred during the spring
and summer of 1992. This means that it was the regime in Belgrade that was
directly responsible for the largest phase of mass killings.
Indeed, the text of the indictment of Milošević for war crimes in Bosnia claimed
that he was part of the Joint Criminal Enterprise, the purpose of which was defined
as ‘‘the forcible and permanent removal of the majority of non-Serbs, principally
Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats, from large areas of the Republic of Bosnia
and Herzegovina.’’ 24 The Joint Criminal Enterprise included the leaders of Serbia,
Montenegro, the Yugoslav army, the Bosnian Serbs, and the Croatian Serb rebels,
with Milošević accused of exercising effective control or substantial influence over
all of them.25 The indictment thus affirmed a central direction and an overall plan
to the programme of ethnic cleansing and mass murder. However, the prosecutors
did not follow this up. Of the seven other members of the Joint Criminal Enterprise
from Serbia and Montenegro who were mentioned in the indictment and were still
alive, only three were ever indicted and none of them has yet been convicted.

The Obsession with Milošević
This brings us to the final reason for the ICTY’s failure: the prosecutors’ obsession
with Milošević as an individual. When I was working at the Tribunal, I was attached
to the investigative team (Team 5) that was responsible for drafting the indictment
of Milošević for war crimes in Bosnia. My team originally drafted a joint indictment of several members of the Joint Criminal Enterprise, including all the other
members from Serbia and Montenegro. However, del Ponte rejected this joint indictment and insisted on indicting only Milošević. At the time, the rumor was that
for egotistical reasons she wanted to have something like a personal duel with
Milošević, as the most famous indictee, and did not want other indictees complicating the picture. Recently, Hartmann wrote to me to suggest a different reason
for Milošević being indicted alone. She argues that the prosecutors wanted rapidly to
indict him for Bosnia and for Croatia, as Milošević had just arrived at the Hague,
and the case against other senior figures from Serbia and Montenegro simply was
not ready.26
Be that as it may, the decision was a mistake. In a recent interview, Nice himself
recognized this. The decision meant that the trial came to an end when Milošević
died. Had several indictees been tried together, the trial could have continued
without him.27 Milošević, as the former president of Serbia and of the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia and as the genuine architect of the war, was certainly an
important figure to prosecute. Had he been convicted and sentenced, justice might
arguably have been at least partially satisfied. But this overemphasis on the internationally infamous figure of Milošević proved counterproductive when he died
before being convicted.
Even if he had survived, the prosecution’s excessive focus on Milošević created
enormous problems for its case. From November 2001, the prosecution sought and
eventually achieved the merging of Milošević’s separate indictments for war crimes
in Croatia, Bosnia, and Kosovo into what Gideon Boas has described as ‘‘one gargantuan indictment,’’ motivated by del Ponte’s expressed belief that such a joinder
‘‘would finally make it possible to know the truth as to the real responsibilities of
the accused Milošević.’’ 28 Yet as Boas had shown, the prosecution’s attempt to have
Milošević tried for a very large number of charges over a very wide crime base not
only made its case quantitatively difficult to manage, but resulted in confusion at
the conceptual level that undermined its effort.29
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Deficiencies in the ICJ
Restricted Definition of Genocide
The ICJ was much older than the ICTY and it is a permanent, not an ad hoc, body.
Nevertheless, part of the reason why Bosnia lost its case against Serbia has its
roots in the political origins of the 1948 UN Convention for the Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. Rafael Lemkin, the man who coined the term
‘‘genocide’’ and who was responsible for its insertion into international law, had
originally favored a broader definition of genocide to the one that was ultimately
adopted. According to the Convention:
Genocide means any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in
whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such:
(a) Killing members of the group;
(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about
its physical destruction in whole or in part;
(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;
(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.30
As Mark Levene has written, Lemkin wanted to include forced exile and population
displacement—i.e., ethnic cleansing—and the deliberate destruction of a cultural
heritage in the list of genocidal acts, but these were vetoed by some of the UN
member states that were involved in the drafting process.31 Since Bosnia proved
that both ethnic cleansing and systematic cultural destruction had occurred in its
case against Serbia, there is no doubt that had Lemkin’s original, broader definition
of genocide been adopted, Bosnia would have won its case.

The Censoring of the Supreme Defence Council Minutes
A second political factor that negatively influenced Bosnia’s chances was the result of
decisions taken by the judges at both the ICTY and the ICJ. Serbia was required to
submit to the ICTY judges in the Milošević case the minutes of the Supreme Defence
Council of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia—the body made up of the presidents
of Serbia, Montenegro, and Yugoslavia (i.e., of Milošević and two of his allies). This
body initially had command over all Bosnian Serb forces, up until 19 May 1992, and
subsequently remained in command of the Yugoslav Army up to and after the time
of the Srebrenica massacre, during which time it collaborated with the Bosnian Serb
forces. The judges at the ICTY, however, allowed Serbia to withhold certain passages
from this set of documents in the version seen by the public and by the ICJ.32 Bosnia
could not, therefore, use these crucial documents for its case against Serbia. Bosnia
requested the ICJ to subpoena Serbia to hand over the uncensored minutes of the
Supreme Defence Council, but the judges refused, claiming that there was already
sufficient evidence in the public domain. Serbia’s unwillingness to allow the uncensored
minutes of the Supreme Defence Council to be made public arose precisely out of its
fear that they would prejudice its case at the ICJ. Phon van den Biesen, a member of
the Bosnian team, has gone on record to say that the full documents would probably
have demonstrated that the Bosnian Serb forces were under Serbia’s control during
the Srebrenica massacre.33
Bosnia’s case against Serbia was a civil case, meaning that if Bosnia had won,
Serbia would have been liable to pay damages to Bosnia. Nevertheless, Bosnia was
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required to prove genocide beyond all reasonable doubt, without having any means of
obtaining confidential documents—no subpoena and no police force. So, on the one
hand, the ICJ expected the Bosnian legal team to prove beyond all reasonable doubt
that Serbia was guilty, as if this were a criminal case, but on the other hand, it
refused to make Serbia hand over key items of evidence and forced Bosnia to rely
on the evidence it had available to it—a policy that would be more appropriate to a
civil case.34

Genocidal Intent
The ICJ judges nevertheless accepted that Serb forces in 1992 were guilty of systematic massive killings and massive mistreatment of the Bosnian Muslims that
bore all the characteristics of genocide, except that genocidal intent had not been
proven. A pattern of killing across Bosnia was shown but was not considered proof
of genocide; ethnic cleansing and cultural destruction were likewise not considered
proof of genocide. Still, the Bosnian legal team succeeded in proving to the judges’
satisfaction that genocide had occurred at Srebrenica in 1995.35 And this peculiarity,
that genocide was proven to have occurred in one place and at one time in Bosnia
but not in any other place or at any other time, raises to some interesting paradoxes.
The Bosnian Serb armed forces were created by the regime in Belgrade and
remained under its formal control up until 19 May 1992. Bosnian Serb commander
Mladić was handpicked by Belgrade for the post. Bosnian Serb forces under Belgrade’s
control were found guilty of systematic mass killings and mistreatment of Bosnian
Muslims across Bosnia, but these systematic mass killings nevertheless fell short of
genocide in the eyes of the judges. However, after this Bosnian Serb commander and
these Bosnian Serb armed forces had become formally independent of Belgrade, they
went on to commit genocide at Srebrenica. It is important to recall, at this point,
the principle of command responsibility. Since Radislav Krstić was successfully
convicted of aiding and abetting genocide, Mladić, as his commanding officer, could
straightforwardly have been prosecuted for the same crime—unless he could show
that he had taken steps to prevent what Krstić was doing or to punish him afterwards, which he evidently did not. Furthermore, Mladić’s direction of the events at
Srebrenica was very public and prominent.36 So according to the ICJ’s reasoning,
Mladić acquired a genocidal intent at some point after he gained his independence
from Belgrade. His forces continued to be armed and supplied from Belgrade, his
officers’ salaries continued to be paid by Belgrade, and the regular Yugoslav Army
continued to provide his forces with logistical support. But, according to the ICJ, by
the time of Srebrenica there was apparently a split between Belgrade, which aimed
to carry out the systematic massive killings, torture, rape, and ethnic cleansing of
Muslims but without genocidal intent, and Mladić’s Bosnian Serbs, who aimed to
massacre the Muslims of Srebrenica, with genocidal intent.
The ICJ’s conviction of Serbia for failing to prevent genocide rested on its
argument that Belgrade should have been aware of the risk that Mladić would not
simply carry out massive killings, torture, and ethnic cleansing at Srebrenica, but
that he had acquired a genocidal intent. The ICJ did not say that Belgrade should
have been aware of this newly acquired genocidal intent on the basis of any documentary evidence or any past behavior. The ICJ said that Belgrade should have
been aware of the risk of genocide purely on the basis of the supposed degree of
popular hatred on the part of local Serbs toward local Muslims in the region around
Srebrenica and on the indications given by Mladić and by international observers
that some sort of massacre was going to happen. The judges ruled:
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The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia leadership, and President Milošević above all,
were fully aware of the climate of deep-seated hatred which reigned between the
Bosnian Serbs and the Muslims in the Srebrenica region. As the Court has noted in
paragraph 423 above, it has not been shown that the decision to eliminate physically
the whole of the adult male population of the Muslim community of Srebrenica was
brought to the attention of the Belgrade authorities. Nevertheless, given all the international concern about what looked likely to happen at Srebrenica, given Milošević’s
own observations to Mladić, which made it clear that the dangers were known and
that these dangers seemed to be of an order that could suggest intent to commit
genocide, unless brought under control, it must have been clear that there was a
serious risk of genocide at Srebrenica. Yet the Respondent has not shown that it
took any initiative to prevent what happened, or any action on its part to avert the
atrocities which were committed.37

So the judges are saying that it was the hatred that was the root cause of the
genocide, and that Belgrade should have been aware of the hatred and of the risk
that it might cause genocide at Srebrenica.
This is plainly nonsensical. Even if one were to accept the highly dubious proposition that it was the local Serb hatred of Muslims that gave rise to a genocidal
intent, there is absolutely no way of showing that Serbs at Srebrenica hated Muslims
more than Bosnian Serbs elsewhere hated Muslims. In other parts of Bosnia, there
were mass killings, incredible acts of cruelty and torture, and the mass rape and
humiliation of women. There is no reason why such things should be evidence of
a lesser degree of hatred than that shown by the Serbs of Srebrenica. If anything,
the Srebrenica massacre indicates more cold-bloodedness than some other Bosnian
Serb war crimes. Furthermore, the systematic massacre of 8,000 people does not
occur spontaneously, but requires a lot of planning and logistical support. It is
difficult to see how Mladić, who presided over this process and who was not even
from Srebrenica, could have imbibed enough of this local hatred to have been moved
to organize such a massacre. And it is doubly difficult to see how Belgrade could
have been aware that Mladić’s Bosnian Serbs hated the Srebrenica Muslims more
than they hated the Muslims they had murdered, tortured, and raped in other parts
of Bosnia. This indicates that the ICJ’s decision to acquit Serbia of genocide and
other genocide-related charges but to find it guilty of failing to prevent genocide at
Srebrenica is a form of practical compromise rather than a decision based on strict
legal principles.

Great Serbia as Alibi
There follows the question of precisely what was the intention of Serbia’s leadership
when it presided over the mass killings in 1992, if it was not genocide. According to
the judges:
The Applicant’s [i.e. Bosnia’s] argument does not come to terms with the fact that an
essential motive of much of the Bosnian Serb leadership—to create a larger Serb
State, by a war of conquest if necessary—did not necessarily require the destruction
of the Bosnian Muslims and other communities, but their expulsion.38

This appears to be a case of honing the definition of genocide down so far that it
disappears altogether. The same logic could be used to argue that even the Nazi
Holocaust, or at least large parts of it, was not genocide. The equivalent would be,
. . . an essential motive of much of the Nazi leadership—to create a larger German
State, by a war of conquest if necessary—did not necessarily require the destruction
of the Jews and other communities, but their expulsion.
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Indeed, the Nazis initially tried to solve the Jewish problem, as they saw it, through
forced emigration. The emigration of Jews from the Reich was not banned until
October 1941, by which time the mass execution of Jewish men, women, and
children was already well underway. The ICJ’s logic would seem to imply that
the Jews murdered by the Nazis, at least up until October 1941, were not genocide
victims.
By acquitting Serbia of genocide on the grounds that its motive was merely to
create an ethnically pure, enlarged state through mass killings and ethnic cleansing,
the ICJ has made mass killings and ethnic cleansing into an alibi for those committing genocide. Indeed, by arguing that genocide ceases to be genocide when the
killers have additional or higher motives for their killings, such as creating a larger
state, the ICJ judges have opened up whole new vistas for the acquittal of states and
individuals accused of genocide. If the creation of a larger state through killings and
expulsions is not genocide, because the goal is the larger state rather than the killing
as an end in itself, what then is genocide? Was the Nazi mass murder of Jewish
hostages in reprisal for guerrilla actions in occupied Eastern Europe genocide?
Was the working to death of Jewish slave laborers to produce armaments for the
Wehrmacht genocide? Or the killing of Jews in Dr. Mengele’s scientific experiments?
After all, in all of these cases, the killings were for the purpose of goals that could
technically have been achieved without them. If you want to be sufficiently pedantic,
then you can make genocide disappear altogether. And this is effectively what the
ICJ judges did.
Indeed, some of the judges themselves did not accept the acquittal. Two of
the fifteen judges, including the ICJ’s vice president, felt that Serbia was guilty of
genocide. Four of the fifteen judges felt that Serbia was guilty of the lesser charge
of complicity in genocide. In the words of Vice President al-Khasawneh:
The Court further notes that the motive of creating a Greater Serbia ‘‘did not
necessarily require the destruction of the Bosnian Muslims and other communities,
but their expulsion.’’ The Court essentially ignores the facts and substitutes its own
assessment of how the Bosnian Serbs could have hypothetically best achieved their
macabre Strategic Goals. . . . Coupled with population transfers, what other inference
is there to draw from the overwhelming evidence of massive killings systematically
targeting the Bosnian Muslims than genocidal intent? If the only objective was to
move the Muslim population, and the Court is willing to assume that the Bosnian
Serbs did only that which is strictly necessary in order to achieve this objective, then
what to make of the mass murder? If the Court cannot ignore that population transfer
was one way of achieving the Strategic Goals, then why should it ignore that, in fact,
the Bosnian Serbs used this method as one of many—including massive killings of
members of the protected group.39

Summing up, al-Khasawneh said,
The Court has absolved Serbia from responsibility for genocide in Bosnia and
Herzegovina—save for responsibility for failure to prevent genocide in Srebrenica. It
achieved this extraordinary result in the face of vast and compelling evidence to the
contrary.40

I am not going to speculate on the motives of the judges. But it does appear that
to acquit Serbia of genocide, while finding the Bosnian Serbs guilty of genocide
at Srebrenica, is more in the nature of a compromise than a genuinely principled
verdict.
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This may reflect a structural flaw in the ICJ as an instrument of justice. If the
judges that make up the panel in a particular case come from different nations,
then there may be pressure on them to uphold their particular national viewpoint
when they deal with a case. So a verdict will reflect, to some extent, a compromise
between different national viewpoints rather than a genuinely objective legal decision. Thus, for example, in each of the nine decisions of the ICJ panel of judges
in the case of Bosnia vs. Serbia, the ad hoc judges appointed by Bosnia and Serbia
each voted in favor of their respective states in every instance, while the judge from
Serbia’s ally Russia voted in Serbia’s favor seven times out of the nine.41 Five out of
the fifteen judges believed that the ICJ did not even have any jurisdiction to try
Serbia for genocide in the first place, an issue which makes the final verdict seem
even more like a compromise representing the middle ground.42

Do the People of the Former Yugoslavia Feel that Justice
Has Been Served?
For these reasons and others, there is a widespread perception among many experts
and commentators on the former Yugoslavia and the international courts that justice
has not been served. The next question is how the working of the international
courts is perceived among the former Yugoslav peoples. The work of the ICTY has
been justified by its supporters as a necessary part of the process of reconciliation
among the nations of the former Yugoslavia. The argument is that it is necessary to
show that particular individuals are responsible for the war crimes, and to punish
them legally and publicly, in order to absolve the nations as a whole of blame. There
is, however, no evidence that this strategy has produced the desired effect. According to a recent study conducted by an international team of scholars led by Vojin
Dimitrijević and Julie Mertus, ‘‘The hope that it [the ICTY] might promote reconciliation between the peoples of the region does not appear to have been realised.’’ 43
The scholars reached this verdict on the basis of an extensive study of opinion polls
carried out in the former Yugoslavia.
This conclusion appears valid. The reasons why ordinary people in Serbia,
Croatia, Bosnia, and Kosovo tend to feel that justice has not been done are, on the
one hand, a tendency to see the indictment of their own war criminals as evidence
of bias against their own nations and, on the other hand, a disappointment in the
failure of the Tribunal to indict or convict certain notorious individuals. Such a sense
of injustice is, of course, encouraged by nationalists among the former Yugoslavs and
often by the governments themselves. Thus, for example, the indictment of prominent Croats and Serbs by the Tribunal has widely been presented as evidence
of anti-Croat or anti-Serb bias. Conversely, the sense of hostile bias has been
strengthened by prominent acquittals. Among Serbs, the effective acquittal of the
Bosnian Army commander in Srebrenica, Naser Orić, for crimes carried out against
Serb civilians at Bratunac is frequently cited as evidence of the Tribunal’s anti-Serb
bias.44 Among Croats, the acquittal of one member of the Vukovar Three and the
initial sentencing of a second member to only a short prison term are likewise widely
viewed as evidence of anti-Croat bias, and have even provoked a complaint from
the Croatian parliament itself.45 Finally, Muslims are widely dissatisfied by the failure
to arrest Mladić. Their sense of injustice, of course, increased by the ICJ’s acquittal
of Serbia for genocide. But the ICJ’s affirmation that genocide occurred at Srebrenica
was immediately rejected by Bosnian Serb Prime Minister Milorad Dodik, who
claimed that the Srebrenica massacre ‘‘was not a genocide, although it was a terrible
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crime.’’ 46 In Serbia, the ICJ’s ruling is widely viewed as a vindication of Serbia’s role
in the war. The fact that the ICJ presented Serbia as guilty of systematic massive
killings of Bosnian Muslims has generally been overlooked.
This failure of the international courts to achieve general acceptance and
legitimacy in the eyes of the former Yugoslav peoples is not entirely their fault. As
far as the ICTY is concerned, for it to have overcome all accusations of bias it would
have had to operate on a much larger scale, to have indicted and sentenced much
larger numbers of war criminals, and to have countered the bad impression created
by the failure to indict certain notorious individuals and by the failure to convict
some of those who were indicted. More importantly, however, the actions of the
international courts, and particularly of the ICTY, were unlikely to promote reconciliation given the low level of public consciousness among different parties about
their own sides’ responsibility for the bloodshed and the unwillingness of the governments to raise this consciousness, by making, for example, public statements of
responsibility or campaigns in the media. For example, because of the widespread
belief in Serbia that Serbs were the least guilty for the war and that the international community is biased against them, and with nationalist politicians such as
former Prime Minister Vojislav Koštunica unwilling to challenge this perception,
any indictment or conviction of Serbs for war crimes is readily perceived as evidence
of this alleged anti-Serb bias. The irony is that, as shown here, Serbia and Serb war
criminals have been treated extremely leniently. Yet the ICTY is nevertheless widely
perceived as anti-Serb by the Serbian public.

Liberating Bosnia of War Criminals
There are some partial qualifications that can be made to this largely negative
evaluation of the record of the international courts. Firstly, the ICTY has at least
succeeded in ridding Bosnia of some of the worst war criminals, who might otherwise
have seriously obstructed the reform and reconstruction of the country that has
occurred since Dayton. In this respect, it does not matter so much that Mladić has
not been arrested or that Karadžić evaded arrest for thirteen years because they
were at least driven underground and removed from the political scene. Among the
Bosnian Croats, for example, Mladen Naletilić and Ivica Rajić have been convicted
and sentenced. Had this not occurred, these two former warlords would in all likelihood have become criminal chiefs in post-war Bosnia, and would have terrorized
local Muslims and moderate Croat politicians and corrupted or intimidated state
officials. The fact that a vastly disproportionate number of Bosnian Serbs and
Bosnian Croats have been indicted—as opposed to Serbs from Serbia and Croats
from Croatia—has worked to the advantage of democracy and reform in Bosnia.
Even simply removing those with blood on their hands from power counts for
something. Nevertheless, if today’s Bosnian political leaders are less murderous
and overtly criminal, this does not mean that they are less nationalistic or more
favorable to the spirit of reconciliation. The repeated threats by the current Bosnian
Serb president and former prime minister, Milorad Dodik, to secede from Bosnia; his
attendance at the nationalist anti-Western rally in Belgrade on 21 February 2008;
his extension of a warm welcome to Bosnian Serb convicted war criminal Biljana
Plavšić following her early release from prison in October 2009; and his claim that
the Srebrenica massacre was not genocide and involved only 3,500 Muslim victims47
are evidence of this.
The second partial achievement of the ICTY is that forced the more moderate
elements in Serbian and Croatian politics to confront the hard-line nationalists
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and to challenge the nationalist taboos. This has undoubtedly catalyzed the development of a more healthy pluralism and post-nationalist governing ethos in Croatia,
although less so in Serbia. Overall, therefore, the international courts have made
a positive contribution to regional progress. But if one ignores pragmatic political
factors and evaluates the international courts simply by the extent to which they
have delivered justice, then they must be judged to have greatly underachieved.
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widely viewed as evidence of anti-Croat bias, and have even provoked a complaint
from the Croatian parliament itself ’’ read ‘‘Among Croats, the acquittal of one
member of the Vukovar Three and the initial sentencing of a second member to
only a short prison term were likewise widely viewed as evidence of anti-Croat bias,
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